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AWARDS ABSTRACT
The invention relates to a digital camera equipped with
apparatus for enabling an image file produced by the camera to be
authenticated.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating prior-art public key
encryption technology and FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating
the prior-art method of producing and using a digital signature in
a system having a private key and a corresponding public key.
In the present invention, illustrated in FIG. 3a, a system 10
comprising a digital camera 11 equipped with a processor 12 for
authentication of images produced from an image file taken by the
digital camera is provided. The digital camera processor 12 has
embedded therein a private key unique to it, and the camera housing
has a public key that is so uniquely based upon the private key
that digital data encrypted with the private key by the processor
12 may be decrypted using the public key. The digital camera
processor comprises means 12a for calculating a hash of the image
file using a predetermined algorithm, and second means 12b for
encrypting the image hash with the private key as shown in FIG. 3b,
thereby producing a digital signature. The image file and the
digital signature are stored in suitable recording means 12c so
they will be available together. Apparatus for authenticating at
any time the image file as being free of any alteration shown in
FIG. 3c uses the public key for decrypting the digital signature
22, thereby deriving a secure image hash identical to the image
hash produced by the digital camera and used to produce the digital
signature. The apparatus calculates from the image file an image
hash 21 using the same algorithm as before. By comparing this last
image hash with the secure image hash 23, authenticity of the image
file is determined if they match, since even one bit change in the
image hash will cause the image hash to be totally different from
the secure hash. FIG. 4 illustrates a colored border of an image
file from a digital camera which includes pertinent information on
camera parameters at the time a digital image is taken and the
public key.
The novelty of the invention resides in the use of an embedded
private key that may be known only to the camera manufacturer until
fabrication is complete. The public key derived from the private
key is then published (put on the camera housing and colored border
of the image frame) for subsequent use at any time to authenticate
the image file used to reproduce an image of a photographed scene.
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ORIGIN OF INVENTION
The invention described herein was made in the perfor-
mance of work under a NASA contract, and is subject to the
provisions of Public Law 96-517 (35 USC 202) in which the
contractor has elected not to retain title.
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TECHNICAL FIELD
The invention relates to the field of photography, and
more particularly to a digital camera equipped with apparatus
for enabling an image file produced by the camera to be
authenticated.
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BACKGROUND ART
At one time, photographs were regarded as a medium that
"never lies." However, the inherent trustworthiness of the
photograph has been compromised by the increasing sophistica-
tion and ease with which photographic images can be manipu-
lated. This problem is particularly severe in the case of
digital cameras (which store a recorded image in digital
memory, such as on magnetic tape or laser disc instead of
photographic film) where the concept of an "original" image is
no longer meaningful.
While a need for authenticating images exists today, the
seriousness of the problem is not yet widely acknowledged.
Consider, for example, that while a photograph can be readily
altered to a limited extent, it can be authenticated to some
degree by comparing a positive print with its negative film
recorded by a camera while inspecting the negative film for
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evidence of physical alteration. Authentication of an image
recorded by a digital camera is more difficult because there
is no physical "original" to examine; furthermore, the digital
image file produced by these cameras (as well as other
digitally recorded artifacts, such as audio and video files)
can be easily manipulated using sophisticated computers which
make such manipulation easy and, as time goes on, more
difficult to detect.
Today, most pictures that appear in newspapers and
magazines have been altered to some degree, with the severity
varying from the trivial (such as deliberately cleaning up
"noise" and removing distracting backgrounds) to the point of
deliberate deception, such as substituting heads on people's
bodies. As the power, flexibility and ubiquity of image-
altering computers continues to increase, the well-known adage
that "a photograph does not lie" will become less credible.
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Background on Digital Signatures
The concept of a digital signature is based upon recent
encryption techniques called "public key encryption." [Whit-
field Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, "New Directions in
Cryptography," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol.
IT-22, No. 6, pp. 644-654, November, 1976; Taher Elgamal, "A
Subexponential-Time Algorithm for Computing Discrete
LogariChms over GF(pa), " IZ_Z TEansaotlonm on Zn£ozmation
Theory, Vol. IT-31, No. 4, pp. 473-481, July 1985; and R.L.
Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman, "A Method for Obtaining
Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems," Communica-
tions of the ACM, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 120-126, February, 1978]
Older encryption/decryption schemes require that both the
sender and receiver possess the same secret "key": the sender
uses the key to transform the text message into ciphertext,
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and the receiver uses the same key to perform an inverse
transformation on the ciphertext, revealing the original text
message. If the correct key transforms the ciphertext into
unreadable garbage, it is reasonable to conclude that either
the wrong key is being used, the message has been altered, or
the sender has been impersonated by someone ignorant of the
fact that a key is required to encrypt so the receiver can
decipher, or what the correct key is. The historic drawback
to this secret key encryption scheme has been in the secure
distribution of keys; key disclosure by the sender to the
receiver must occur out-of-band, either transmitted via an
expensive alternate path or arranged at some prior time, such
as when sender and receiver were proximate.
Public key encryption techniques differ in that they
enable the recipient of a message to decrypt it using a public
key that is different from the one used by the sender to
encrypt it, but mathematically related to it. Thus, public
key encryption employs two different keys: a private key,
which is held by the more security conscious party, and a
corresponding public key, which need not be kept secret. The
public key is generated based upon the private key, making the
pair unique to each other.
All public key cryptography is based on the principle
that it is easy to multiply two large prime numbers together,
but extremely diffiault (taking pezhaps oenturies using
today's supercomputers) to work backwards and uncover the
factors that could have been used to generate the resulting
number.
The public key scheme is illustrated in FIG. 1 and works
as follows: to send a secret message that only the recipient
can read, the recipient would first make his/her public key
known to the sender via any non-secure medium, such as a
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letter, a telephone conversation, or a newspaper notice.
Anyone wishing to send a secure message would encrypt the
message using this public key and send it to the recipient.
The recipient, having sole possession of the corresponding
private key, is the only one able to decrypt the message. The
need to transmit a secret key that both parties must possess
beforehand is thus eliminated. The tradeoff in this case is
that, although only the recipient can read the message, anyone
who obtains the public key can send a message with anonymity.
The process described above can also be implemented
"backwards" to great advantage. In a second scenario, it is
the sender who maintains possession of the private key, and
anyone who has the widely disseminated corresponding public
key is able to decrypt this message. Although this procedure
no longer performs the traditional function of encryption
(which is to provide confidential communication between two
parties), it does provide a way to insure that messages are
not forged: only the private key could have produced a
message that is decipherable by anyone having the correspond-
ing public key.
The foregoing provides the foundation for the concept of
digital signatures; encoding a smaller representation of the
message to verify the integrity and source of the message.
The sender of a message generates a unique digital signature
by hashing the memsage and using a private key to enorypt the
hash. There is a public key corresponding to the private key
to enable decryption of the hashed message. The digital
signature is transmitted along with the plain, unencrypted
message so that a recipient may decrypt the digital signature
and thus authenticate the message. A comparison of the
decrypted hash and a hash of the message transmitted with the
signature will readily show, if the decrypted hash and the
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hash of the transmitted message do not match, that the message
has been altered or has been transmitted by a person other
than the one possessing the private key, which is itself a
digital code. If the private key remains private, then only
the private key holder can produce messages decipherable by
the public key. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to
reverse-engineer the public key and ascertain the original
private key. Without knowledge of the private key, a
counterfeit message cannot be forged.
Digital signatures thus build upon these public key
cryptographic techniques and allow a recipient to authenticate
the contents of a plaintext message as well as the identity of
the sender without obscuring the original message. Digital
signatures are produced by creating a hash of the original
plaintext message, and then encrypting the hash using the
sender's private key, as shown in the top half of FIG. 2. The
result is a second, smaller digital file referred to as a
signature which accompanies the original plaintext message as
a separate block of data.
A "hash" is a mathematical function which maps values
from a large domain into a smaller range. For example, a
checksum is a simple kind of hash. A more complex example of
a hash algorithm would involve dividing a binary file into a
collection of, say, 16 kilobit pieces and performing a
cumulative exclusive-OR function between suooessive pieces.
That produces a simple 16 kilobit hash which is smaller than
the original file yet is practically unique to it. Many more
complex and secure transformations are also possible. An
advantageous characteristic of a hash is that changing a
single bit in the original message hash would produce a very
different hash output. This advantage will become apparent in
the present invention. Another advantage is that reverse
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engineering a message so it will have a given hash value, and
also make sense to the reader is virtually impossible. Thus,
a digital signature can be created by encrypting the output of
the hashing function using a sender's private key.
In the use of a digital signature, the original message
is untouched; only the message's hash is encrypted. This way,
the original file can be read by all, yet each recipient may
authenticate it by decrypting the message's unique digital
signature using the public key. If the decrypted digital
signature and an independent hash on the file in question
match, both the integrity of the message and the authenticity
of the sender can be assured.
15
2O
25
Digital Cameras
Standard digital cameras are filmless; they sense light
and color via an electronic device, such as a charge coupled
device commonly known as a CCD, and produce as output a
computer file which describes the image using data bits (l's
and 0's) arranged in a meaningful, predefined format. Often
this digital image file is first stored on a small mass-
storage medium inside the camera itself, such as a magnetic
floppy disc, or a magneto-optical disk commonly referred to as
a compact disc (CD), for later transference to a digital
system for image processing and/or display. Alternatively,
the image file can be sent directly to a digital system via a
transmission medium. Once inside the digital system, it then
can be displayed and easily altered in any number of different
ways.
30
STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION
An objective of the present invention is to provide a
solution to the problem of authenticating digital images
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reproduced from an image file, where the image file may be a
single still image from a camera, a sequence of images from a
digital video camera, or even a digital hologram or digital
audio from a recording system. Authentication in this sense
means to establish as worthy of belief that the image file has
not been altered. The term "image file" is thus used herein
to refer to the recorded file of a digital still camera, a
digital video camera, a digital holographic camera system, or
a digital audio recorder.
In accordance with the present invention, a digital
camera is equipped with not only the means for providing an
image file (either stored in an internal medium for later
transmission or transmitted directly to a digital image
processing system) but also first means for providing a hash
of the image file (or blocks of the file in the case of a very
long image file, such as from a video camera), and encrypting
the hash with a unique private key embedded in second means
(known to nobody except perhaps the manufacturer of the camera
or this second means implemented, for example, as a programmed
microprocessor) for which there is a known public key unique
to the camera. The encrypted hash is stored along with the
image file for later authentication.
For authentication of the image file, means for hashing
the image file in question produces a checking hash, and means
for deorypting the digital signature using the publio key
reveals the true hash produced by the digital camera from the
true image file and means for comparing the checking hash with
the true hash. If the two hashes match, it is certain that
the image file is authentic, i.e., that the image file has not
been altered.
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating public key
encryption.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating the method of
producing and using a digital signature.
FIG. 3a illustrates a preferred application of the
present invention to digital cameras.
FIG. 3b is a block diagram of the present invention as
applied to digital cameras for producing a file image with a
digital signature to allow authentication of the file image by
the recipient.
FIG. 3c is a block diagram of a system for authenticating
the file image from the digital camera of FIG. 3a.
FIG. 4 illustrates a colored border of an image from a
digital camera.
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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
As applied to digital cameras, the objective is to
provide a digital signature for an image file as it emerges
from a camera system 10 for later authentication as required.
To accomplish this, the digital camera 11 produces from a
contained processor 12 two output files for each captured
image as shown in FIG. 3a: the first is an all digital,
industry standard format image file representing the captured
image. The seoond would be an enozypted digital mignature
produced as shown in FIG. 3b by applying the camera's unique
private key (embedded within the digital camera's secure
microprocessor 12b) to a hash of the captured image file,
produced by hashing microprocessor 12a for creating an image
hash, thus producing the digital signature which, like the
image file, may be recorded in the recorder 12c of the digital
camera system 10 or transmitted to a digital processor's memo-
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ry. It is the responsibility of the user to keep track of
both the image and digital signature files once they leave the
camera i0 since both are required to authenticate the image.
Once the digital image file and the digital signature
are generated and stored on a medium in the camera system and
then transferred into a digital processor memory, or
alternatively transmitted directly to a digital processing
system, the image file's authenticity can be affirmed at any
time thereafter by a decrypting system 20 shown in FIG. 3c
using a public key taken from the camera name plate or the
image's border. The public key can be freely distributed to
users and certification authorities via conventional software
distribution techniques. This authentication system 20 has
neither the public nor the private key stored. It requires
as inputs the digital image file in question, its accompanying
digital signature file, and the public key which is unique to
the camera believed to have originated the image and digital
signature files. It is perfectly reasonable to use as the
public key the camera's serial number appearing on the
camera's name plate which is used by the manufacturer to iden-
tify the camera for such purposes as warranty repair or
replacement.
The authentication system 20 calculates its own image
file hash using a hash calculator 21 comprising a digital
p;ooesmlng symkem p:Og:&_ed with _ho m&mo hamhlng ilgo:l_hm
used in the digital camera which need not be kept a secret and
a decryptor 22 comprising a digital processing system using
the public key to decrypt the digital signature. That then
reveals the hash originally calculated by the digital camera
processor 12 at the time the image was taken. Note that both
the hash calculator 21 and the decryptor 22 may be implemented
in the same digital processing system 20. A comparator 23
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receives the image hash from the hash calculator 21 and the
secure image hash from the decryptor 22. If these two hashes
match, it is certain to any required degree that the digital
image in question is indeed identical to what the digital
camera system I0 originally produced. If, on the other hand,
even one single bit in the image being authenticated has been
altered, the two hashes will not even closely match and the
image's authenticity will be indicated as not being affirmed
by an authenticity output signal A; otherwise the comparator
will indicate authenticity by a signal A.
If the technique is to be effective (i.e., no false
positives or false negatives) and extended to larger data sets
such as digital audio, digital video, or even digital hologram
recording, reliance is made upon the accomplishments of the
computer mass storage industry, which has already achieved the
ability to store and deliver extremely large binary data sets
without errors. On the other hand, analog techniques such as
audio cassette tape or the NTSC encoding on today video tape
formats, or noncorrected digital formats such as the popular
audio compact disc (CD), which is so unreliable that CD player
manufacturers now utilize special techniques, such as
"oversampling" to combat the problem of missed bits, introduce
such a large number of errors upon playback which are normally
imperceptible to the human viewer/listener, are unsuitable for
tho purpomes of image authentioation. ConmequentlM, the
present invention is directed to digital recording systems of
all kinds such as digital audio, video and hologram recording
for authentication of recorded files collectively referred to
as image files. On the other hand, the claims appended hereto
are to be construed to cover all recording means: a digital
camera for image recording is used as an example to illustrate
a preferred embodiment of the invention. The term "image
F93183 ii
file" used for that example applies directly to the recorded
file in other systems as well, such as digital audio recording
systems.
5
I0
15
2O
25
3O
Measures of Protection
The invention as described above is resistant to forgery
attempts since the private key (which is known to nobody
except possibly the manufacturer of the camera) is embedded in
a probe-proof microprocessor which itself is deeply integrated
into the camera's digital system. Even if some adept pirate
were to dissect the camera and replace the microprocessor chip
with one containing a homebrew key, the digital signature
produced thereafter would not be decryptable by any public key
published by the manufacturer.
The advantages to freely distributing the verification
algorithm and valid public keys are great; with the algorithm
freely available, verification can become commonplace and
routine. No special certification authority need be involved
in routine authenticity checks and no bad-faith amongst the
parties involved need be created as a result of being
challenged. But the mass distribution of the verification
algorithm does carry one danger: it would be easy for someone
to create a bogus program which looks, behaves, and has the
same file length as the genuine verification algorithm with
the only difference being At always proclaims a "hash match"
regardless of the authenticity of the image being verified.
With the algorithm freely and widely available, this is not a
large risk as additional copies can be easily obtained from
multiple sources and a more reliable authenticity check made
by a best two-out-of-three scheme. Alternatively, as a weak
check, a digital signature and an image file known to have an
altered image may be used to check the algorithm of the
F93183 12
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authenticator created to always proclaim a "hash match." When
the stakes are high and it is extremely important that the
authentication algorithm be known to be genuine, an indepen-
dent certification authority or the manufacturer of the
digital recording system (the digital camera in the example)
could be called in to provide their own copies of the
algorithm and the public key from their own list of public
keys (serial numbers) at the time of authentication.
The algorithm and private key necessary for encrypting
the digital signature file from within the digital camera are
to be embedded inside a new class of secure microprocessors
whose ROM contents cannot be read once the recording system
leaves the factory. Because the private key used for
encryption is hard-coded into the microprocessor chip by the
manufacturer (who must then ensure the private key remains
secret), credibility of the recording system's output becomes
an extension of that of the manufacturer; the digital
signature from the digital camera can be considered to be
just as reliable and secure as if the signature had been
generated by the manufacturer.
Each digital camera should possess its own unique pair of
private and public keys, with the private key etched into the
system's secure microprocessor and the public key stored in
three places: in a public key list kept by the manufacturer,
on _he d_g_tal oamoza'm nan_me p_mte _tUel_ (wh_oh oan then aloo
double as the camera's serial number), and in a colored border
as shown in FIG. 4 which contains more data about the captured
image as will be discussed in more detail below. Assigning
unique keys to each camera has the benefit of avoiding instant
obsolescence which would occur if only one private key were
used for all cameras, and that key were to be compromised. An
even higher level of security would occur if the manufacturer
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were to destroy all records of each private key as the cameras
are manufactured, since at that point the private key is no
longer needed by the manufacturer. This would eliminate the
possibility of compromise via industrial espionage or theft.
Finally, regular and free distribution of all valid
public keys is desirable to defeat a counterfeiter who has
learned of the encryption algorithm employed and has written
a program to produce digital signatures based on his own
private key. Decoding these forgeries would require the use of
a public key not generated by the manufacturer. Freely dis-
tributing updated public key lists would make it easy to
identify and thwart such attempts.
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Uses of the Invention
The single most obvious use of the present invention in
digital cameras would be in situations where proof of image
authenticity is necessary; such as for legal evidence,
insurance claims, or intelligence gathering. The inevitable
transition to digital cameras and electronically-transmitted
images will also make it more difficult for the photographer
to protect his image copyright, since electronic images tend
to proliferate faster and with less control from the author
than the traditional distribution method which places image
control in the hands of whoever holds the original negative or
transparency. Just as it is common practice today to obtain
releases from photographed persons for any published picture
containing a recognizable image of the person, it is
reasonable that in the future no electronic image will be
published without first having authenticated the image using
the digital signature of the camera which is registered with
the photographer in order to thwart claims that photographs
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published have been altered and to improve the trustworthiness
of all publications and to uphold copyright claims.
This technique need not be limited to still digital
images. Because digital signatures can be used to verify any
block of digital data in an image file, it can also be
implemented in digital video cameras and digital audio
recorders as well, as noted hereinabove. In all of these
devices, a digital signature can be generated and recorded
each time the recording process stops or pauses, or after each
block of data; each sound byte or video "take" is hashed,
encoded and written at the time it is recorded, or in the case
of continuous recording by a digital, audio or video recorder
at the time each block is completed by using the technique of
multiplexing between three sets of buffers; as one buffer is
filled with a block of data, another is hashed, encrypted and
recorded at a faster clock rate so that its algorithms are
complete in time to record the digital signature before a
multiplexer shifts functions amongst the three sets for the
next block of data. Thus, with three sets of buffers A, B and
C, assume A is receiving input, B is hashing and encrypting
it, and C is recording. During the next block interval, the
functions are switched A to B, B to C and C to A, and during
the third block interval the functions are again switched B to
C, C to A, and A to B. The following block interval commences
a new multiplexing cycle. In that manner, real-time recording
is delayed by only three block intervals.
3O
A Special Border
In the case of the digital camera equipped with the
present invention being targeted towards legal authentication,
a few additional features can be implemented to better serve
this use. A brightly colored border could automatically be
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generated as part of each captured image file. Within the
border would appear (as shown in FIG. 4) textual information
about the image: the date and time it was taken, the ambient
light level seen by the camera at the time of exposure, the
original color temperature of the scene, the software version
of the camera's firmware, f/stop and shutter speed (or the CCD
equivalent "sample time"), the camera's public key, the
focusing distance of the lens at the time of exposure, a
unique sequence number, and (when the technology allows for a
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver to be built into the
camera) the geographical coordinates of the camera, indicating
where in the world the picture was taken.
The ambient light level and color temperature readings
would be useful for getting a feel for exactly what the scene
was like at the time of exposure; something a sensitive opti-
cal element might inadvertently hide via automatic exposure
and color correction. The lens' focused distance and //stop
are there to help detect potential abuse of the camera:
taking close-up pictures of a modified photo and trying to
pass it off as an unaltered original.
Since all these textual data in the colored border are
part of the authenticated image file, their credibility are
also upheld when authenticated by the authentication process.
The accuracy of the date and time information would again be
thm rmsponmiblliCy of Ohm seouro m£o_oprooesmozp in addition
to being able to keep its algorithm and private key a secret,
it also could have a lithium battery powering a system clock
set to Universal (Greenwich Mean) Time at the time of
manufacture. If the timer should ever fail or is tampered
with, the system would be programmed to fill the time and date
fields with XXXX's, eliminating the chance of an erroneous
random time being indicated for the actual time.
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Higher Level of Security
Although the present invention offers a satisfactory
level of security, nevertheless there still exists a small
possibility that a determined saboteur will be able to crack
the camera's private key given an extended amount of time.
(No cryptographic scheme will protect data forever; given
sufficient time, advancements in code breaking or improved
computer horsepower will be enough to render any given level
of cryptographic protection obsolete.) If the discovered
private key were then to be available to the user of the
compromised camera (the camera having the corresponding public
key (serial number)), it would allow the individual having
image files from that camera to generate authentic-looking
digital signatures on altered image files, essentially under-
mining the credibility offered by the compromised camera.
However, the security level of other cameras in use, and of
images taken with those cameras, will still remain uncompro-
mised.
It would be wise for a manufacturer of such digital cam-
eras to regularly upgrade and enhance the sophistication of
the encryption implementation as newer camera models are
introduced, typically using longer encryption/decryption key
lengths and improved encryption/ decryption and hash algo-
rithms. It is expected that evolving authentication algo-
rithms (the publio domain oomponent of this authentioation
invention which is to be freely distributed) will then be
designed to recognize, identify and authenticate all previous
versions.
Because the encryption details must necessarily be
changed often (depending on the technological capabilities of
the day), no single image format, key length encryption, or
hashing algorithm is being specified. Instead, reference is
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made to the National Institute of Standards and Technology's
(NIST) proposed Digital Signature Standard (DSS) as an example
for implementation of the present invention. [Dennis K.
Branstad, "The Proposal for a U.S. Standard for Digital
Signature Encoding," IEEE Spectrum, pp. 30, August 1992]
A specific application of the present invention is
directed toward the solution of an ever more troubling social
problem, namely the eroding credibility of photographic
images, but its application in audio, video and holographic
images may also benefit from it. Although it will always be
possible to lie using a photograph by such time-honored
techniques as false perspectives and misleading captions, the
present invention will prevent the rapid development of very
capable personal computers from increasing the incidence of
altered images being passed off as authentic images.
F93183
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISCLOSURE
A digital camera equipped with a processor for authenti-
cation of images produced from an image file taken by the
digital camera is provided. The digital camera processor has
embedded therein a private key unique to it, and the camera
housing has a public key that is so uniquely based upon the
private key that digital data encrypted with the private key
by the processor may be decrypted using the public key. The
digital camera processor comprises means for calculating a
hash of the image file using a predetermined algorithm, and
second means for encrypting the image hash with the private
key, thereby producing a digital signature. The image file
and the digital signature are stored in suitable recording
means so they will be available together. Apparatus for
authenticating at any time the image file as being free of any
alteration uses the public key for decrypting the digital
signature, thereby deriving a secure image hash identical to
the image hash produced by the digital camera and used to
produae the digital signature. The apparatus oalaulates from
the image file an image hash using the same algorithm as
before. By comparing this last image hash with the secure
image hash, authenticity of the image file is determined if
they match, since even one bit change in the image hash will
cause the image hash to be totally different from the secure
hash.
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